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Abstract
Medical cyber-physical systems (MCPS) integrate sensors, actuators, and software to improve patient safety and quality
of healthcare. These systems introduce major challenges to safety analysis because the patient’s physiology is complex,
nonlinear, unobservable, and uncertain. To cope with the challenge that unidentified physiological parameters may
exhibit short-term variances in certain clinical scenarios, we propose a novel run-time predictive safety monitoring tech-
nique that leverages a maximal model coupled with online training of a computational virtual subject (CVS) set. The pro-
posed monitor predicts safety-critical events at run-time using only clinically available measurements. We apply the
technique to a surgical glucose control case study. Evaluation on retrospective real clinical data shows that the algorithm
achieves 96% sensitivity with a low average false alarm rate of 0.5 false alarm per surgery.
Category: Smart and intelligent computing
Keywords: Medical cyber-physical systems; Data-driven approach; Computational Virtual Subjects; Safety
monitoring; Glucose control
I. INTRODUCTION
Medical cyber-physical systems (MCPS) introduce
new design and verification challenges due to their
increasing complexity and life-critical nature [1]. Physio-
logical closed-loop systems are an important class of
MCPS and can improve both patient safety and effective-
ness of healthcare. From a control perspective, modern
healthcare involves many concurrent feedback loops in
which patients are the plants. Current medical workflow
relies on human caregivers to make all control decisions
where patient safety can be compromised by human
errors and miscalculations. An automatic controller can
be used to partially close the loops by performing normal
control actions when patients’ conditions are stable.
Caregivers can therefore concentrate on making import-
ant decisions and will be alerted by the controller in the
presence of adverse events. Such closed-loop systems
can ultimately improve patient safety and also the quality
of care since computers are good at carrying out compli-
cated calculations that enable individualized clinical
decision support. However, physiological closed-loop
systems share a few key characteristics that present major
safety challenges:
• Models contain unobservable states. Physiological
modeling involves a trade-off between accuracy and
controllability. Coarse-grain models with a few state
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variables abstract away a lot of complicated plant
dynamics, which could result in inaccuracy. On the
other hand, high dimensional models capture the
plant behavior at a fine-grained level but usually
include many physiological state variables that are
not observable by current technologies. For example,
diabetes control has been extensively studied for
decades. This research has resulted in a variety of
physiological models. A comprehensive review on
this subject can be found in [2]. The glucose physio-
logic models are broadly classified into two catego-
ries: 1) the coarse-grain, minimal models that describe
the key dynamics using a compact set of state vari-
ables and parameters [3, 4]; 2) the fine-grain, maxi-
mal models that characterize the glucose metabolism
using high-dimensional nonlinear equations and many
patient-dependent parameters [2, 5-8]. The maximal
models include variables such as total insulin mass in
liver and insulin signals governing glucose consump-
tion in interstitial fluids, none of which can be directly
measured.
• Unidentifiable model parameters. Every patient
responds to medications differently. The difference
manifests itself as notable model parameter variances
across patients. Although the parameters are subject
to physiological limits and it is possible to estimate
population-wide distributions, it is in general very
hard or prohibitively costly to identify the parameters
for each individual [2]. For example, maximal glu-
cose models contain multiple rate parameters describ-
ing the transportation of glucose and insulin between
body compartments (organs and tissues), and they
can only be measured for individuals by advanced
isotope marker tracking technologies in a tightly-con-
trol experimental environment, which is too resource
and time consuming to perform on all patients.
• Unidentifiable short-term physiological variance.
In certain clinical scenarios, e.g., surgical glucose con-
trol, patients can suffer from stress-induced hypergly-
cemia during surgeries, which can lead to elevated
infection risk [9-11]. From a modeling perspective,
those transient changes in the physiology can mani-
fest as temporal fluctuations in certain physiological
parameters, e.g., insulin sensitivity. Coping with such
short-term changes of physiological parameters is an
especially challenging problem considering that most
parameters cannot be directly measured, and there
currently lacks quantitative clinical understanding on
how the parameters may change over short periods.
In this paper, we present a run-time safety monitoring
technique that leverages physiological models to track
transient changes in patient’s physiology. We apply the
technique to a surgical glucose control application. The
monitor predicts safety-critical events by online training
of a computational virtual subject (CVS) set using real-
time glucose measurements. Specifically, the monitor
predicts when glucose levels deviate from a specified
region in a near future time window. This data driven
approach and several related research thrusts are dis-
cussed in [12].
To the best of our knowledge, the idea of using CVS
for data-driven adaptive safety monitoring has not been
explored before. An implementation of the proposed
methodology is evaluated on retrospective real patient
data, and the results illustrate that our prediction algo-
rithm achieves 96% sensitivity with an average false
alarm rate of 0.5 false alarm per surgery. The proposed
system is designed to provide clinical decision and sup-
port—the 96% detection rate and 0.5 false alarms per sur-
gery are significantly better than most safety critical
threshold monitors used in surgery today, e.g., pulse
oximeters [13].
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
In this paper, we consider the glucose control for surgi-
cal patients, who need insulin infusion for blood glucose
level (BGL) regulation, either because they are diabetics
or they are non-diabetics but may be at risk of surgery-
induced hyperglycemia. Here are a few assumptions for
surgical glucose control:
• The BGL is measured and the control input (insulin)
is updated at check points separated by a fixed time
interval T. For example, according to the Hospital of
the University of Pennsylvania Cardiac ICU Intraop-
erative Insulin Protocol (HUP IIP), BGL should be
measured and the insulin dosage should be updated
every 30 minutes.
• The past BGL readings and insulin rates are docu-
mented and accessible by the safety monitor. 
• Patients do not eat during surgeries, i.e., no meal dis-
turbances need to be considered.
• Insulin is only given by intravenous (i.v.) infusion.
Fig. 1 shows the overall system architecture. BGL sen-
sor readings are passed to both the controller (ICU proto-
col or other control algorithm implemented by caregivers)
and the safety monitor. The controller calculates an insu-
lin dosage based on certain algorithms. The safety moni-
tor (details are explained in subsequent sections) predicts
the range of the next BGL reading, assuming the sug-
gested insulin dosage is given. If the predicted range is
safe, then the suggested dosage is passed to the actuator
(pumps). Otherwise, the safety monitor raises an alarm of
possible unsafe insulin dosage and feed the information
back to caregivers for further assessment.
We use the maximal glucose metabolism model that
has been introduced in [6, 14], which is the model that the
FDA-accepted T1DM Simulator is based on [15]. Given
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the assumptions listed above, we can trim certain compo-
nents from the original model (e.g., the meal absorption
process and subcutaneous insulin dynamics). We rewrite
the model consisting of insulin and glucose sub-systems
as follows, using states and parameters listed in Tables 1
and 2. More details of the model can be found in [6, 14].
(1a)
(1b)
(1c)
(1d)
. (1e)
The glucose system:
(2a)
(2b)
The only observable input and output to the system are
u (insulin infusion rate in pmol/min) and y = Gp/Vg
(plasma BGL in mg/dL). The connection between the
insulin and glucose subsystems is that the states X' and Id
of the insulin sub-system affect the glucose dynamics.
The glucose subsystem contains nonlinear terms: max
(0, kp1 – kp2 * Gp – kp3 * Id) for endogenous glucose pro-
duction, max (0, ke1 * (Gp – ke2)) for renal glucose clearance,
and  for insulin’s impact on glucose
consumption.
In the rest of the paper, we use X to denote the 7-
dimensional state vector X = [Ip, X', I1, Id, Il, Gp, Gt]
т, y and
u to denote the model output and control input, respec-
tively, and P to denote the 20-dimensional parameter vec-
tor (see Table 2). The complete model can be written in
an abstract form = f (X, P, u), y = X(6)/Vg.
A “virtual subject” is an instantiation of P. The param-
eters are subject to physiological limits, and their distri-
butions, nominal values, and bounds have been studied
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Fig. 1. Architecture of safety monitor for surgical glucose control.
Table 1. State variables
State variable Meaning
I
p
Plasma insulin mass
X’ Remote insulin signal
I
1
Delayed insulin signal auxiliary variable
I
d
Delayed insulin signal
I
l
Liver insulin mass
G
p
Plasma glucose mass
G
t
Tissue glucose mass
Table 2. Parameters
Parameters Meaning
m
1
Rate parameter
m
2
Rate parameter
m
3
Rate parameter
m
4
Rate parameter
k
i
Rate parameter
k
e1
Glomerular filtration rate
k
e2
Renal threshold of glucose
P
2u
Rate parameter
V
i
Insulin volume
V
m0
Model parameter
V
mx
Model parameter
I
b
Basal insulin level
BW Body weight
K
m0
Model parameter
k
1
Rate parameter
k
2
Rate parameter
k
p1
Extrapolated EGP
k
p2
Liver glucose effectiveness
k
p3
Insulin action on liver
V
g
Glucose volume
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clinically [6, 14]. In this paper, we assume upper and
lower bounds of the parameters are given, i.e., a parame-
ter Pi is drawn from the interval [MINPi, MAXPi].
The safety property is derived from the clinical require-
ment, i.e., the BGL should not drop below a critical
threshold. This is the most important safety requirement
for BGL regulation [16].
The problem can be formulated as follows: for an indi-
vidual patient, at any check point N, given the past
sequences of BGL measurements and insulin rates (i.e.,
y1, ..., yN−1 and u1, ..., uN−1, respectively), current BGL yN,
and suggested control input uN, is uN safe for the patient,
that is, for a given uN, is it possible that yN+1 < L?
III. SAFETY MONITOR DESIGN
In this section we present our safety monitor algo-
rithm. The algorithm consists of two phases.
1. In Phase A, we generate a set of CVS (called the
covering set [CS]) by randomly sampling parameter
vectors from the bounding hypercube and we show
that the CS gives predictions of BGL that cover a
large possible range with certain degree of unifor-
mity.
2. In Phase B, we use the CS for predictive safety mon-
itoring. At each check point, we use the CS to simu-
late a patient’s past BGL sequence and compute the
prediction error of each CVS. The CVS in the CS
are then ordered by how well their predictions match
the true past BGL. Then we take the suggested con-
trol input and use the sorted CVS to predict the
range of the patient’s next BGL. If the predicted
range is unsafe, then an alarm is raised to notify
caregivers.
In the rest of this section, we explain the technical
details of the two phases of our method.
Covering set generation and validation. As mentioned
before, a fundamental challenge of using maximal mod-
els in glucose control is that most elements of the param-
eter vector cannot be identified given the currently
available clinical data. Suppose the patient is at a certain
state (X0, y0) and has a true parameter vector P
T, and we
know nothing yet about PT except that PT is bounded in a
20-dimension hypercube HP. But we know that each vec-
tor Pk ∈ HP will “drive” the physiological process Ẋ =
f (X, P, u) from the initial state (X0, y0) to another state
( , ) after one sample interval T, assuming u0 is given
during the interval. The first question we consider is: if
we only know that PT is somewhere in HP, what is the
distribution of { } and which vectors Pk will drive  to
a specific range?
This question has an intuitive interpretation in glucose
control: assuming the patient’s current BGL is at y0 and
he/she is given a certain amount of insulin u0, what is the
BGL after a time interval T?
The second question we consider is as follows: given a
certain initial state (X0, y0), can we pick a set of parameter
vectors PCS so that the corresponding predictions { }
“cover” the range of possible BGLs? PCS is called the
covering set (CS) and the vectors in it are computational
virtual subjects (CVS). The first question is a CS genera-
tion problem and the second one is a CS validation problem.
We cannot use the existing physiological virtual sub-
jects (PVS) in the T1DM Simulator as the CS for two rea-
sons. First, the size of the PVS set is quite limited (300),
and we need a much larger set of virtual subjects to gen-
erate a good covering range of BGL, which is essential
for the safety monitor. Second, the PVS were derived
from experimental clinical data such that they can mimic
a group of real human patients, but there is no guarantee
that those PVS cover all patients.
The details of the Phase A are explained as follows.
A.1 CS generation
• A.1.1 Choosing the initial condition (X0, y0). The
quality of CS will be related to how (X0, y0) is cho-
sen. The difficulty is that the model is unobservable,
i.e., for a given y0, there are infinitely many corre-
sponding X0’s. Inspired by the idea that an “insulin
sensitivity test” tries to stabilize the patient’s physio-
logical states before the test starts, we tackle the dif-
ficulty in the following way: the academic version of
T1DM Simulator includes 10 PVS that are drawn in
the same way as the FDA approved PVS population,
we run the 10 PVS on the simulator and obtained the
initial states generated by the simulator. To fully
excite the dynamics and explore a large range of
{ }, we choose a high initial BGL y0 = 250 mg/dL
and let u be the “250 mg/dL BGL” action item defined
in the previously mentioned HUP IIP, which is 10 U/hr
infusion for T = 30 minutes and 10 U insulin bolus
given immediately. We experiment with the 10 PVS’
X0’s given by the T1DM Simulator and pick the one
that gives the largest distribution range of { }.
• A.1.2 Given the (X0, y0, u0) and T, we randomly sam-
ple PCS from the bounding hypercube HP (Due to the
lack of accessible clinical knowledge of how the
physiological parameters are correlated statistically,
the sampling process does not assume any prior cor-
relation between different parameters. One of the
current limitations of this work is the lack of statisti-
cal guarantee that the sampled virtual population suf-
ficiently represent all real patients), simulate the
model on each vector Pk ∈ CS, and get the corre-
sponding  after T. We collect a large set (1.5 mil-
lion in our implementation) of sample vectors Pk so
that the distribution of { } covers a sufficiently
large range. The sufficiency can be justified by clini-
X
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cal knowledge of how fast human BGL can drop: the
BGL decline/rise rate is subject to physiological lim-
its, e.g., it is written in HUP Glycemic Control Proto-
col for cardiac surgical patients that “the average rate
of decline should be no more than 50 mg/dL per
hour”.
• A.1.3 From the large set of randomly sampled {Pk}
and the corresponding { }, we select a subset of
{Pk} as the CS, such that the corresponding { }
uniformly cover the entire range of { }. The CS is
not constrained by clinical data and can be much
larger than the FDA-accepted 300 PVS (in the imple-
mentation we have 10,000 CVS in the CS).
A.2 CS validation
In Step A.1.3, the CS is selected to uniformly cover
{ } given the (X0, y0, u0) picked in Step A.1.1 We cannot
simply conjecture that CS will generate a uniformly dis-
tributed predictions of yN+1 for any previous state and
input tuple (XN, yN, uN). Therefore, we need to validate CS
for different tuples (XN, yN, uN) and test the coverage of
predicted {yN+1}. The validation algorithm works as follows:
• A.2.1 First, we generate a set of test cases to validate
the CS. Each test case is a four-value tuple (XN, yN,
uN, yN+1). Ideally, such test cases should be from real
clinical data, but as mentioned before, it is impossi-
ble to fully measure XN directly from patients. So
instead, we run a real hospital protocol (the HUP IIP)
on the T1DM Simulator (with its 10 PVS) starting at
different initial conditions, and we obtain a large set
of simulated patient BGL trajectories.
• A.2.2 We then test the entire CS on every single test
case obtained in the previous step. Specifically, for
each test case (XN, yN, uN, yN+1), we simulate the
model on every Pk ∈ PCS for one sample interval,
starting from (XN, yN) and using uN as the control
input. At the end of the interval, we get a  which
is the prediction of the true value yN+1. We then mea-
sure the quality of coverage of all the predictions
{ } by two criteria: 1) { } should contain yN+1,
i.e., yN+1 ∈ [min{ }, max{ }]; 2) { } is dis-
tributed around yN+1 with a certain degree of unifor-
mity, which will be defined in the next step.
• A.2.3 In Step A.1.3, the CS is selected such that the
{ } has a uniform distribution. However, due to the
nonlinear nature of the model, it should not be
expected that the same CS will generate { } that
have the same near-uniform distribution starting
from any initial state (XN, yN, uN, yN+1). In addition, for
the safety prediction purpose, we do not need a per-
fectly uniform distribution. Instead, what we need is
that there are enough candidate predictions in { }
that fill a neighboring region of yN+1. The uniformity
metric we use to test the coverage of { } is there-
fore defined as follows:
– We first determine the neighboring region of yN+1.
Again, the size of the region depends on the size of
the maximum prediction range in the control step,
which is set to 60 mg/dL, i.e., the [max (yN+1 – 30,
30), yN+1 + 30] neighboring region. The lower bound
saturates at 30 because BGL < 30 mg/dL is clinically
considered to be life-threatening (extreme hypogly-
cemia). Also, 30 mg/dL is significantly lower than
the commonly-used hypoglycemia alarming thresh-
old, which is typically in the range of 70–110 mg/dL.
– Next, we test the minimum density of predicted BGL
values in { } that fall into the neighboring region.
The density is defined as the average number of val-
ues in { } that fall into a unit length (1 mg/dL)
BGL interval. The density is computed by a binning
algorithm: put the values in { } that are in the
neighboring region into small-sized (5 mg/dL) bins
and find a bin with the minimum counts to calculate
the minimum density. If the “density” is no less than
1 counts per mg/dL, then the CS passes the coverage
test on the case (XN, yN, uN, yN+1). For extra redun-
dancy, our algorithm actually achieves minimum
density of 8 counts per mg/dL.
Data-driven adaptive safety monitoring. The Phase B
is repeated at each check point. We use the identified and
validated CS to predict a patient’s BGL one sample inter-
val ahead, given only the past BGL readings and insulin
inputs. This is a challenging problem. Existing model-
predictive control (MPC) approaches for glucose control
either use a simple linear model to approximate the non-
linear dynamics, or require parameter pre-tuning. It is
known that there is a fundamental analytical limitation of
parameter identification on high-dimension unobservable
nonlinear glucose models: it is not possible to uniquely
identify all unknown parameters given only the limited
single input and single output data [2]. Instead of directly
identifying PT, we propose a data driven technique to
adaptively train CS on past sequence (y, u) (the past
sequence gets updated each step as new measurements
and control actions are taken), and then use the trained
CS to predict the range of next BGL reading. The pre-
dicted range is then used for the safety monitoring. 
B.1 CS Training
The training set is a sequence of past BGL and control
actions, {(yi, ui), ..., (yN−1, uN−1), (yN)}. N is the current
check point and yN is the current BGL. The training set
contains the latest N – i + 1 BGL and N – i control actions
(a control action is effective for an interval between two
y’s so there is one less control action than the number of
y’s). Initially i = 1. These records are accessible in ICUs,
e.g., at HUP, the BGL readings, control information, and
patient-related information are recorded electronically.
The CS is trained as follows:
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• B.1.1 We simulate the model on the CS, starting from
yi. Each P
k ∈ PCS generates a corresponding simulated
trace { , ..., }.
• B.1.2 The simulated traces are compared to the true
trace {yi, …, yN}, and L-2 norm errors are calculated for
each trace.
• B.1.3 We sort the CS by the non-decreasing order of
the prediction errors.
B.2 Range prediction
To predict the range of the next BGL yN+1, we initialize
a set RN+1 as empty.
• B.2.1 We start from the top of the trained CS, retrieve
a vector Pk, extend the simulation , ...,  by one step
(assuming the suggested control input uN is given at
check point N), put the predicted  into RN+1, move
onto the next vector in the trained CS, and repeat the pro-
cess.
• B.2.2 RN+1 holds predictions of yN+1 of a top subset of
CVS in the trained CS. The minimum and maximal val-
ues of RN+1 are the predicted range for yN+1. We put pre-
dictions  into RN+1 until at least one of the following
two stopping conditions becomes true:
• The predicted range exceeds a pre-defined window
size. This window size directly affects the RN+1 and
the performance of the prediction algorithm. We
develop a double-zone strategy to determine it. If
min (RN+1) > Wb, i.e., min (RN+1) is above some thresh-
old Wb, then the stop condition is
(max (RN+1) – min (RN+1)) > WH,
where WH is the maximum window size of the “high”
zone. If 
min (RN+1) ≤ Wb,
then the stop condition is 
(max (RN+1) – min (RN+1)) > WL,
where WL is the maximum window size of the “low”
zone. The idea is that when the predicted BGL in
RN+1 are relatively high (above Wb), we allow a larger
prediction window. And when some predicted BGL
in RN+1 are in the low zone, we narrow down the pre-
diction window because now the predicted BGL are
closer to the unsafe region and a narrower window
can reduce the false positive rate.
• The bottom of the trained CS is reached; i.e., all pre-
dictions by the CS have been put into RN+1. 
The predicted range of yN+1 is given by [min (RN+1),
max (RN+1)].
B.3 Robust safety monitoring
Using the predicted range 
[min (RN+1), max (RN+1)],
if min (RN+1) is less than the pre-defined safety limit L,
then it implies the suggested control input uN may drive
yN+1 into the unsafe region, and an alarm is to be raised
and fed back to caregivers. This is currently a binary clas-
sification alarm, but one can also use [min (RN+1), max
(RN+1)] to generate a more informative, fuzzy-logic alarms:
for example, generating alarms with different levels of
urgency depending on how much [min (RN+1), max (RN+1)]
intersects with the unsafe region.
B.4 Adaptive training window adjustment
The training sequence grows as more BGL readings
are collected. Sometimes the real BGL trajectory could
exhibit unpredicted fluctuations (In the patient data, we
have seen some BGL changes that cannot be well
explained by models: for example, when the BGL tends
to stabilize around a certain level and insulin infusion rate
does not change for a while, there are sometimes sudden
BGL increases, i.e., the patient appears to be more resis-
tant to insulin for a short period. Anesthesiologists at
HUP are interested in such scenario when we replayed
the retrospect BGL data and specifically pointed out a
few such “turns”. Their medical opinions are that there
are some other factors, e.g., body temperature and sur-
gery-induced stress level, that they believe also change
patients’ insulin sensitivity, but those effects are not mod-
eled by even the state-of-the-art maximal models. The
doctors think it would be useful if we can compare the
model-predicted BGL with the true BGL in real time and
alert them when such “turns” happen (which can be done
with our framework) as they believe these events could
suggest some physiological state changes that they con-
cern.). An interesting phenomenon is that the unmodeled
dynamics not only causes prediction errors at the “turns”,
but also affects subsequent predictions after the “turns”
even when the patient’s physiological states stabilize
again. This is because in the learning step, the CS is
trained by prediction errors calculated over the entire
training window. If there are unpredicted “turns” in the
window and we keep them for future predictions, then the
CS will always try to learn the “turns” because they dom-
inate the prediction error.
To cope with such cascading error issue, we dynami-
cally adjust the training window in real time. Whenever a
true reading yN+1 lands outside the predicted range, we
remove all past readings before yN and the new training
sequence starts from yN for future predictions (we need to
keep yN because we need at least one interval, i.e., two
past readings, for training when predicting yN+2). The
rationality is that a BGL “turn” indicates a possible
change in the patient’s physiological parameters, so the
safety monitor should also be reset to match such change,
instead of keeping old past readings and still trying to
learn the “turns” starting from old initial states.
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IV. EVALUATION
We implement the complete safety monitoring algo-
rithm and evaluate it on de-identified, retrospective
patient glucose data collected from the Hospital of the
University of Pennsylvania (with the Institutional Review
Board approval). In this section, we present the results of
the implementation and the evaluation using real patient
data. We also discuss several design trade-offs regarding
how to configure our algorithm according to different
clinical needs.
CS generation and validation. Starting from y0 =
250 mg/dL, u0 = 10 U/hr infusion plus 10 U insulin bolus
and setting the sampling interval T to be 30 minutes, we
explore the distribution of predicted { } given ran-
domly sampled CVS. To fully explore the possible distri-
bution of { }, we sample 1,500,000 CVS in the
bounding hypercube HP and the distribution of { } is
shown in Fig. 2.
The distribution covers a large range from 20 mg/dL to
as high as 400 mg/dL. Hospital protocols consider 50 mg/dL
per hour a dangerously high BGL decline rate. The low-
est predicted BGL after 30 minutes is 20 mg/dL, which
translates into a 460 mg/dL per hour drop rate, more than
9 times larger than what the protocols consider danger-
ous. On the highest end, the highest predicted BGL is
around 400 mg/dL. Clinicians consider 10 U/hr to be a
very high insulin dose, and it is very unlikely that a
patient’s BGL can even increase from 250 mg/dL to
400 mg/dL in 30 minutes given such a high insulin rate.
The simulated {y1} clearly covers a sufficiently large
BGL range. From the 1.5 million candidate CVS, we
select 10,000 CVS into the CS such that the {y1} cover-
age of the CS is uniformly distributed, as shown in Fig. 3.
To validate the coverage of { } produced by the CS
given any starting state, we extract test cases from the
simulated BGL trajectories that are obtained by running
the T1DM Simulator together with the HUP IIP protocol
controller at different initial conditions. We simulate the
10 PVS included in the T1DM simulator starting from 18
different initial BGLs ranging from 70 mg/dL to 240 mg/dL
(sampled every 10 mg/dL) and obtain 180 simulated
BGL trajectories. A test case is extracted at each 30 min-
utes check point of a trajectory, and for each trajectory
we extract test cases from the first 24 check points (time
0 to 12 hour), because after 12 hours the simulated BGL
trajectories are oscillating around an equilibrium (the ini-
tial transient response fades away). Therefore we get
4,320 (10*18*24) test cases. For each test case, we calcu-
late the minimum density of CVS in the neighboring win-
dow of yN+1.
Fig. 4 shows the distribution of the minimum density
values of CVS in all test cases. The overall minimum
density value in all 4,320 test cases is 8.6 counts per mg/dL,
which is greater than the required 1 per mg/dL, i.e., the
generated CS passes all 4,320 coverage tests.
Safety monitor evaluation. We use the generated CS to
test our safety monitor. For safety and regulatory reasons,
we cannot directly test this newly designed monitor tech-
nique on human patients without extensive offline exper-
iments. We demonstrate the validity of our approach by
replaying retrospective patient BGL data on the safety
monitor, which, from a computational perspective, is the
same as if the safety monitor is tested in the real clinical
environment. The data is collected from 51 de-identified
type 1 diabetic patients who received cardiac surgery and
were on the HUP IIP (so insulin inputs are known). As
defined by the protocol, the BGL readings were taken
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Fig. 2. Distribution of 1,500,000 simulated y1’s.
Fig. 3. Distribution of the simulated y1’s of the 10,000 CVS
chosen by CS.
Fig. 4. Distribution of minimum density of CVS in 4,320 test
cases.
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every 30 minutes.
The evaluation algorithm works as follows. We retro-
actively run the HUP IIP and our safety monitor on the
real BGL data. At each real BGL reading, the safety mon-
itor computes the range of the next BGL reading given
the control input determined by the HUP IIP and predicts
whether or not the next BGL reading will be safe. Then
we move on to the next BGL reading, check it against the
predicted range, and repeat the process.
CS training and range prediction. For each patient,
we start prediction on y3 (y1 and y2 are used as the initial
training set) and proceed until the end of each data trace.
Fig. 5 illustrates how the adaptive learning algorithm
works on a patient’s data trace. At each check point, the
algorithm predicts yN+1 one interval ahead by picking
those CVS that achieve lowest prediction errors on the
past sequence (yi, …, yN). As shown in Fig. 5, our algo-
rithm adaptively tracks the true BGL trend. At N = 3
there are only 2 history readings and 1 interval in the
training set. The training set is so small at that point that
it cannot fully separate the large CS. That is why the pre-
dicted values of y3 cluster around the true y3 but the BGL
trajectories are further apart in the future. The algorithm
only needs to predict one step ahead at a time, so future
divergences are irrelevant (as Fig. 5 shows, the predicted
range converges as the monitor moves to N = 4 and 5).
We test the monitor on 51 patients’ data. Overall there
are 246 BGL readings, among which 144 BGL readings
can be used to test the prediction algorithm (the first two
readings of each patient are needed for initial training and
cannot be predicted by the monitor). The performance of
the safety monitoring algorithm can be tuned by setting
the threshold L and window sizes differently. In practice,
those parameters should be set according to clinical
needs. According to the IIP, clinicians consider BGLs
less than 60 mg/dL as critical condition and start to take
precautions when the BGL drops below 100 mg/dL.
Therefore, we set the alarming threshold L to be 100 mg/dL.
Table 3 reports the performance matrices of the monitor
(the parameters are set as follows: Wb = 110, WH = 60,
and WL = 30). The result shows that the monitor achieves
96% sensitivity (24 out of 25 unsafe events are correctly
identified) with less than 0.5 false alarms per surgery on
average (24 false alarms on 51 patients and each patient’s
data is collected during one surgery).
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have developed a data-driven safety
Fig. 5. Prediction snapshots at (a) N = 3, (b) N = 4, and (c) N = 5 on a sample patient.
Table 3. Evaluation results on 51 patients’ data (144 prediction
points) when L is set to 100 mg/dL
L = 100
Safe (true) Unsafe (true)
Safe (predicted) 95 1
Unsafe (predicted) 24 24
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monitoring technique to adaptively track real-time physi-
ological changes and predictively alert caregivers to
future critical events. We applied the technique to a surgi-
cal glucose control application and developed a novel
CVS-based approach for robust safety monitoring. Eval-
uation on a clinical dataset shows that the proposed safety
monitor achieves high sensitivity with a low false alarm rate.
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